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Abstract: 
In this paper we analyse some of the organisational aspects of the urban solid waste collection 
and, in particular, the privatization modality of contracting out. We start by discussing some of 
the theoretical aspects of contracting out. We then specify and estimate an explanatory model on 
a sample of municipalities that we surveyed. Our purpose is twofold: on the one hand, we 
identify the economic factors at work when deciding to contract out the service and, on the other 
hand, we analyse the role of ideological factors in choosing between the public production of the 
service or contracting it out. The results show a significant effect of the demand for waste 
collection on contracting out. There also appears to be a neighbouring effect as the municipalities 
close to other cities that contract out are also more prone to do so. Finally, the decisions to 
contract seem to have been motivated by pragmatic rather than ideological reasons.  
Key words: privatization, contracting-out, local government, public services. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The literature on privatization has increased enormously in the last years. Many theoretical and 
empirical papers are devoted to the study of the objectives and the effects of privatization of 
public companies that operated in competitive markets where no market failures were present and 
those that operated in non-competitive markets and thus enjoyed considerable market power. 
Vickers and Yarrow (1991) refer to these transfers from the public to the private sector as type 1 
and type 2 privatizations, and add a third type of privatization that has been much less studied: 
the contracting out of services previously provided by the public sector. 
 Even though it does not imply the sale of physical assets, contracting out is another type 
of privatization, as it consists of the sale of a service or franchise contract. The contractor, public 
or private, appropriates any financial surplus derived from the service and the appropriation of 
this benefit is central to the idea of property. 
 Contracting out has particularly increased in the UK and US in the last two decades. In 
the US, the local governments have faced tax revolts since the late 1970s, cuts in federal and state 
programs and other financial difficulties. These factors forced them to rethink the way local 
services were provided and financed.1 In addition to the decrease in the financial resources, the 
taxpayers’ demand for better services without increasing in taxes increased (Savas, 1998). This 
put pressure to increase the productivity in the provision of local services.2  Altogether these 
factors contributed to the spread of contracting the provision of local services in the US.3 
 During the 1980s the British government was interested in reducing the size of the public 
sector and cutting back the power of trade unions. Thus it was favourable to contracting.4 Ascher 
(1988) argues that the likelihood to contract out was larger if it appeared as a natural response 
than if it was imposed politically. Yet, the British government passed the Local Government Act 
in 1988, where competitive bidding was made compulsory. Taxpayers who wanted cheaper 
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services and business groups which saw in the bidding for services the possibility for potential 
economic benefits supported the Act. The opposition to privatization came from government 
employees and trade unions.5 
 Reimer (1999) has studied the expansion of contracting after the obligation established by 
the Local Government Act of 1988. He concludes that the spread of this formula followed a 
sequential process. During the first years after the law was passed, there was a clear relationship 
between the ruling party in the local administration and the winner of the bid. However this 
relationship vanishes as time goes on. In the last years, economic or geographic factors, such as 
closeness to one of the establishments of a private provider, have been more powerful 
explanations than ideological reasons. More precisely, contracting out seems to spread in a 
network way; the likelihood to contract increases as more municipalities in the same area use this 
formula. 
 Spain is one of the pioneering countries in this type of privatization, especially in urban 
solid waste collection. In some cities -such as Barcelona- contracting stems back to the XIX 
century. In recent times, since the 1960s there have been many cases of contracting which is now 
used in an increasing fashion. Surprisingly enough, there is no tradition in the study of this 
phenomenon and the studies in Spain, in particular the economic analysis, are scarce. In Spain –
as in US- competitive tendering is not compulsory, opposite to UK. Since the decision of 
contracting out is entirely up to each local government, what are the factors that influence this 
decision?  
In this paper we try to somehow fill in this gap by studying the determinants of 
contracting out urban solid waste collection in Spain. In the first section we survey the theoretical 
literature on contracting from which we derive the hypothesis for our empirical test. In the second 
section we specify a model that explains the decision to contract out. We then test some 
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hypothesis determining such a decision, like for example the need to undertake organisational 
reforms and the importance of political factors. Finally we summarise the most important results. 
 
THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACTING OUT. 
Even though contracting has not received as much attention in the literature as other aspects 
related to the public sector and public services, this is not a new concern either. Back in 1859 
Edwin Chadwick defined the concept of competition for the sector, as opposed to the better know 
competition within the sector.  Chadwick (1859) argued that in some services with decreasing 
average cost, such as water distribution, the competition resulted in inefficiencies and thus he 
recommended to auction all the service. 
 The fact that the local government is required to guarantee the service does not mean that 
it also needs to provide it itself. Donahue (1989) points out that sometimes the municipality is not 
the optimal geographical unit to produce the service. The private companies enjoy some 
advantages over the public administration: (1) more flexible labour, incentives and 
accountability, (2) less restrictions in the procedures and a higher orientation towards results. 
 An especial advantage is the economies of scale. That is, the private companies can 
efficiently distribute the fixed costs over several geographical units, as they are not necessarily 
constrained to a single municipality. Thus, some welfare gains are to be realised. Graph 1 shows 
that if the total market demand is larger than that of the municipality, the company can offer a 
lower price. The shaded area depicts the welfare gains to the municipality.  Figure 1: Economies 
of scale realised by contracting out the services. (pag. 20) 
 The contractor can also use a wide incentive scheme for its employees, such as the top 
positions in different locations. Furthermore, the contractor enjoys more incentives for innovation 
and organisational improvement. Hart, Schleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that, unlike the 
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government, the private sector has more incentives to pursue innovations to improve quality or 
reduce costs because they can claim property rights over the innovations. In short, opening up to 
competition by a bidding process can result in cost minimisation and thus technical efficiency. 
Graph 2 shows the welfare gains due to scale economies together with technical efficiency. 
Figure 2: Welfare gains realised by contracting out the services. (pag. 21) 
 Contracting does not come without problems though, the most important being the 
transaction costs (Domberger and Jensen, 1997). Transaction costs include administrative costs 
and those of incomplete contracts, because it is impossible to write a contract that foresees all 
contingencies. Bailey and Davidson (1999) find out that even ten years after contracting, the local 
governments still incur in costs of monitoring inputs and performance of the service. In fact, the 
emphasis on procedures, one of the most stressed pitfall in the public provision of services, does 
not disappear when the service is contracted but it only takes another form. Sclar (1997) argues 
that one needs to take into account the theory of the organisational dimension and the distinction 
between spot and contract markets. The former deal with standardised products, where a high 
degree of competition is possible and quality can be monitored. However, the contract markets 
are different. For example, they refer to continued services. 
 In addition to the importance that the contract be well-specified, Domberger and Jensen 
(1997) explain that contracting will be more successful: (1) the less the magnitude and specificity 
of the actives; (2) the more negligible the non contractable quality characteristics –i.e., those 
difficult to be specified and monitored-; and (3) the higher the real or potential competition in 
supply. In other words, the theory suggests that the higher the uncertainty, the higher the risks of 
failure of contracting. It also suggests that the public provision will be more efficient than 
contracting the larger the active specificity is. 
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 In the case of solid waste collection, there is little magnitude and specificity of actives, 
quality can easily be monitored and there might be substantial competition on the supply side.6 
Therefore, it is an adequate service to contract. 
 The pure market formula, where every household contracts its own service to a private 
provider, has clear disadvantages. It is usually more expensive because no economies of scope 
can be realised. There are also additional costs of individual billing, i.e., because the contractor 
must bear the cost of unpaid bills, it might charge higher service fees. These are reasons why a 
unique provider has generally carried out solid waste collection7, and the payment consists of a 
mandatory local fee. Depending on the formula specified in the contract, the fees fund either the 
direct provision of the service or are used to make a global payment agreed upon in the contract. 
The existing empirical studies on the effects of contracting out urban solid waste collection refer 
mostly to the US and the UK. The results indicate that in general there have been cost reductions 
derived from contracting out the service.8 
 
I. A model for deciding to contract out solid waste collection in urban areas. 
Our hypothesis is that the local governments use contracting as a response to the need to improve 
on the organisation and flexibility of the service. This is motivated by the efficiency gains 
derived from economies of scale and the reduction of X-inefficiencies. These benefits must be 
compared with (1) the possible gains from improving the internal organisation of direct public 
provision and (2) the costs of monitoring associated to contracting. On the other hand, 
contracting is favoured in those areas where there have been previous experiences with this 
formula. Finally, we hypothesise that local politicians follow pragmatic rather than ideological 
criteria to take decisions. 
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 We use a binomial discrete choice model to test our hypothesis. Our dependent variable is 
the method of production of the service –Y- and it takes value zero in case of direct public 
production and one if the service is contracted. We regress the dependent variable on a number of 
explanatory variables. The statistical inference is performed for two different periods: first, for 
the period 1979-98, that is, since the first year of democratic local governments and second, for 
the period 1991-98, for which information on all the explanatory variables is available. 
 
a. Data and sources. 
Our sample consists of municipalities in Catalonia that filled out the Survey on Production of 
Local Services, a survey designed and carried out by our research group. The survey was sent to 
all municipalities in Catalonia.9 We have data on the nature of the provision of the service (i.e., 
whether it is publicly or privately produced), the level (local or supra-local) at which the service 
is produced and the year when the service was contracted, if it was. The information on the 
demand side was obtained from two different sources: (1) for the period 1979-98, we use the total 
population as a proxy for the demand of the service and it was obtained from the statistics of the 
Catalonian Statistical Institute, (2) from 1991 on, we have direct data on the demand of the 
service provided by the Catalonian Council of Waste. The latter allowed us to create an 
indicator for daily generation of waste. The data on the local electoral results were obtained 
from the Catalonian Statistical Institute.10 The data on the structure and dispersion of the 
municipalities was obtained from the Information System of the Local Government. Finally, 
the data on financial burden was provided by the Catalonian Auditing Agency, the information 
being available since 1990.  
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b. The explanatory variables. 
The demand for solid waste collection (Q) is the first explanatory variable we consider. As the 
demand increases the management of the service becomes more complex so that organisational 
improvements and more flexibility are required. The increase in the demand implies an increase 
in the expected profits due to the reduction of inefficiencies through contracting out, while the 
supervision costs associated to contracting out become relatively less important with dimension. 
These factors might have a positive impact on the decision to contract. However, there might be a 
limit to the exploitation of economies of scale.11 On the other hand, high levels of urban solid 
waste collection are associated to large cities, which in turn are most capable to undergo 
organisational reforms, hire the best managers and introduce elements of flexibility in the 
provision of the service. 
 It is plausible to think that the relation between the level of solid waste and the decision to 
contract out has an inverse-U shape. This suggests that in relatively small cities the obstacles to 
contract out are higher, due to high supervision costs, little benefits to be enjoyed from reducing 
inefficiencies, and less of a tendency to organisational changes. As demand increases, the 
supervision costs become relatively less important, the advantages from reducing inefficiencies 
increase and so does the probability to contract out. However, when demand is too high the 
exhaustion of economies of scale and the higher capacity to undertake organisational 
improvements in the public production of the service could put a halt to the decision of 
contracting. 
 In the analysis for the period 1979-98, we use the population variable (POP) as the proxy 
for the demand for the service. This variable is constructed from the local population from the 
Census of Population. We take the population from the Census nearest to the year when the 
service was contracted. For those cities where the service has always been provided directly by 
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the local government we take the population from the 1996 Census, the last year available. We 
also include the square of the population (POP2) to test for the inverse U-shape hypothesis.12 For 
the period 1991-98 we use the variable Daily Generation of Waste (DGW) that directly measures 
the demand for the service. For those cities where the service was contracted, we take the value 
of this variable in the year when the decision of contracting was taken. For the other cities, we 
use the value of Daily Generation of Waste in 1998, the last year available. As with the 
population, we also include the square of this variable (DGW2) to test for the inverse U-shape 
hypothesis. 
 Our second explanatory variable is the municipality dispersion (D), which includes the 
number of population units in the city. The higher the dispersion, the higher the costs of the 
service and thus the higher the complexity. This factor would favour contracting. 
 The third explanatory variable tries to capture the neighbouring effects that might play a 
role, positively influencing the choice to contract out. One of these indicators is the use of 
contracting in the municipalities nearby or in a given area of reference. Following Reimer (1999) 
our hypothesis is that the neighbouring effect positively influences the decision to contract out for 
two reasons. First, the closeness to cities where the service is contracted enables the private 
providers to offer attractive plans to the municipality that is considering to contract, due to 
economies of scale.13 Second, the local government can compare the management of the service 
with that of the neighbouring cities or reference cities, which in turn favours contracting out. To 
pick up the neighbouring effect we use a variable called (NE). This variable is the percentage of 
the municipalities in a reference area that had contracted out the service by the beginning of the 
period considered.14  For the period 1979-98 we use the benchmarking in 1979 (NE79); for the 
period 1991-98, we use that in 1991 (NE91). 
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 The fourth explanatory variable is the ideological stand of the local government, given by 
the variable called Political Indicator (PI). This is a qualitative variable that takes value 1 if in the 
year the service was contracted the municipality had a right-wing or center-right government, and 
it takes value 0 if the political stand of the local government was left or center-left. In those cities 
where the service had not been contracted the variable takes value 1 if the right or center-right 
governments had been predominant during the period considered, and it takes value 0 otherwise. 
If the ideological position of the local government plays a role in the decision to contract, we 
would expect this variable to be significant. On the contrary, if the decision has a pragmatic 
motivation this variable would not be significant. 
 Finally, for the period 1991-98, we include two additional variables: the Index of Global 
Financial Burden (IGFB) that captures the financial burden for each municipality, and the supra-
local association of the service (SLA). As for the variable IGFB, we would expect the 
organisational reform to be more likely as the budget restrictions of the municipality are higher, 
because there is a need to cut on expenditures then. The data for this variable is only available 
since 1990, so we can only use it for the period 1991-98. For the municipalities that contracted 
the service we take the financial burden of the year prior to the decision of contracting, as the 
debt burden should have had an effect prior to the decision. For those municipalities that directly 
produced the service during the period we use the fiscal burden in 1997. 
 Our last variable is the supra-local association of the service (SLA), which implies the 
transfer of the service to a public body of a higher geographical dimension. In the case of 
Catalonia, new administrative units were defined in 1987: the ‘comarcas’ (counties) which 
constituted a geographical unit larger than the municipality, especially appropriate to share the 
provision of the service. The supra-local association could have favoured the decision to contract 
because it increases the volume of waste collection and thus the dispersion in the area then 
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covered. Therefore, it introduces complexity in the service and economies of scale advantages 
that can induce to contract. Moreover, the transfer of the service to a higher body involves an 
organisational change that might favour the political decision to contract. To be sure, as the 
distance between the citizens and the decision-making body increases, the political risk of 
privatization for the local government reduces. On the other hand, aggregating the service at a 
superior geographical level could be seen as an alternative way to contracting out in order to 
achieve economies of scale. The variable SLA is qualitative and takes value 1 if the municipality 
has the service transferred to this superior administrative unit and it takes value 0 otherwise. 
 
c. The model. 
 
The function for the increase in the expected utility of the local government takes the following 
form: ∆U0,1=f (Q,D,NE,PI,IGFB,SLA), where 0,1 indicates the change from direct production of 
the service to contracting, and the arguments in the utility function have already been discussed 
above. 
 As we also explained, the model we use is a binomial discrete choice model, where the 
dependent variable takes value 1 if the municipality contracted out the service during the period 
analysed and it takes value 0 if the service continued being publicly produced. That is, for each 
municipality i:  
  Period 1979-1998   Period 1991-1998 
  1 if ∆U0,1i=f (Q,D,NE,PI)i > 0  1 if ∆U0,1i=f (Q,D,NE,PI;IGFB,SLA)i > 0 
Yi=  
  0 if ∆U0,1i=f (Q,D,NE,PI)i ≤ 0  0 if ∆U0,1i=f (Q,D,NE,PI;IGFB,SLA)i ≤ 0 
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 We run two estimations. The first one comprises the period 1979-98, for which we use the 
population as a proxy for the demand for waste collection and we do not include the budget 
restriction and the supra-local association variables. In the second estimation, period 1991-98, we 
have information on all the variables; in addition, the demand variable directly measures the 
demand for the service. 
 The models estimated are the following: 
 
(1) 1979-1998: Yi =  Φ(β0+ β1POPi + β2POPi2 + β3Di + β4NE79i + β5PIi) + εi 
(2) 1991-1998: Yi = Φ(β0+ β1DGWi + β2DGWi2 + β3Di + β4NE91i + β5PIi + β6IGFBi + β7SLAi) + εi 
 
 
Where Φ is the cumulative distribution function for a standard normally distributed variable and 
ε is the disturbance term. This is a probit model.15 Finally, for each period we estimate the model 
without including the political indicator (PI) and including it. The reason for this is that we think 
it is interesting to see how the estimation with only economic variables does. 
 
II. The results. 
 
Table 1 shows the results for the period 1979-98 (equations 1 and 1bis). Table 2 presents 
the results for the period 1991-98. The overall significance of the model is quite high, especially 
for the best specifications of the model, equations 1 (overall significance > 99%) and equation 
2OK (overall significance > 97.5%). The explanatory power of the model is moderate but by no 
means unimportant. The R2 ranges between 0.205 and 0.259 (which is not a bad range being a 
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binomial discrete choice model) and it is slightly higher for the period 1991-98. This might be 
due to the higher accuracy of the variable DGW as an indicator for the demand and the inclusion 
of the supra-local association variable even though it does not appear to be significant. The 
demand variable, either proxied by the population (POP) or by the generation of waste (DGW), is 
the most significant, around 1% significance level. The fact that the signs are positive for POP 
and DGW and negative for POP2 and DGW2 validates the hypothesis that the relation between 
the demand and the tendency to contract out displays an inverse-U shape. That is, the decision to 
contract is more likely as population increases up to a point where this tendency reverses. 
The other variable that seems to explain the decision to contract is the existence of 
neighbouring municipalities where contracting is used (NE); this variables is always significant at 
significance level inferior to 5%. The higher the percentage of neighbouring municipalities that 
already contract out, the more likely that the municipality will decide to contract out the service. 
The dispersion of population in the city and the supra-local association do not appear 
significant. Neither does the financial burden. The variable IGFB,16 that we use for the period 
1991-98, has a positive sign, as expected, but its coefficient is not significantly different from 
zero. The financial situation of the municipalities does not seem to have an effect on the decision 
to contract. 
Finally, the variable PI, that represents the ideological stand of the local government, is 
not significant. This suggests that the local politicians take a pragmatic rather than ideological 
position when considering these issues. 
Table 1. Factors explaining the decision to contract solid waste collection, 1979-98. (pag. 22) 
Table 2. Factors explaining the decision to contract solid waste collection, 1991-98. (pag. 23) 
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IV. Conclusions. 
 
 Spain is one of the pioneer countries as far as contracting urban solid waste collection is 
concerned. The use of this formula has increased in the last years. In this paper we analyse the 
determinants of the decision to contract out this service. The existing literature suggests a number 
of hypotheses to explain this decision so we set up an explanatory model where we test for these 
alternative hypotheses. 
 Our results indicate that there is a significant relationship between the demand for waste 
collection and the decision to contract. Moreover, this relationship is inverse-U shaped. We 
interpret this as follows. The cities with relatively small population, and thus small demand, can 
take little advantage of reducing inefficiencies while they face relatively large supervision costs if 
they contract. These factors, together with the fact that they are less able to undertake 
organisational reforms to improve the service, explain the small probability to contract in this 
type of municipalities. As the population increases, the supervision costs decrease relatively and 
the expected benefits from contracting out increase, which in turn make the cities more prone to 
contract. However, economies of scale might be exhausted after some city size is reached. 
Similarly, very large cities might be more capable to undergo internal reforms in the direct 
production of the service. Thus, when the cities are too large the probability to contract out 
decreases.  
 The municipalities show a higher probability to contract the more spread this formula is in 
the neighbouring cities. There are two reasons for this. First, the politician has more available 
information on the results of contracting, which reduces the uncertainty and risk associated to the 
change in the management of this service that has high social sensitivity. Second, the contractors 
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operating in the municipalities close to the one considering this formula can exploit economies of 
scale and therefore offer attractive contracts to the city.  
 We do not find evidence of the municipality budget restrictions having an effect on the 
decision to contract. The financial reasons, which have motivated the privatization of public 
companies, play a small role in this case because this type of privatization does not generate any 
receipts to the administration. The objective of improving efficiency might have played a more 
important role. Our results are supportive of the hypothesis that the local governments were led 
by pragmatic rather than ideological reasons. 
 There are other interesting aspects in the process of organisational reform in the 
management of local services that we do not analyse here. In particular, the issues related to the 
effects on efficiency and effectiveness of the services contracted out, the tendency to 
concentration in this type of services and the consequences for the competition are central to the 
discussion. We leave these issues for a future research agenda. 
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Figure 1: Economies of scale realised by contracting out the services. 
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Gráfico 1: Economías de escala en la contratación 
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Figure 2: Welfare gains realised by contracting out the services. 
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Table 1. Factors explaining the contracting-out of solid waste refuse collection, 1979-1998. 
 
 Equation 1 Equation 1bis 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient 
Constant - 0,1328 
(0,668) 
-0,0489 
(0,922) 
POP 0,0001 
(0,014)b 
0,0001 
(0,009)a 
POP2 -1,96 · 10-9 
(0,006)a 
-2,02 · 10-9 
(0,004)a 
D -0,0201 
(0,565) 
-0,0249 
(0,469) 
NE79 0,0259 
(0,048)c 
0,0252 
(0,050)c 
PI - 0,2382 
(0,594) 
Test Wald Test of joint significanfe* 0,0037a 0,0079a 
R2 aproximado 0,2045 0,2074 
N 90 90 
 
Notes: In parenthesis, probabilities that the coefficient be zero, using White’s robust estimation. 
- Here and also in table 2, the superscripts indicate the following significance levels: a=1%, 
b=2.5% and c=5%. 
- *=Probability of non-significance of the model (also for table 2). 
 The likelihood test confirms equation 1 as the best one. In particular, chi-squared takes 
value 0.178972, which lies on the range of non-rejection of the null hypothesis, the null 
hypothesis being that PI should not be included.  
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Tabla 2. Factores determinantes de la contratación externa de recogida de residuos sólidos, 1991-
1998. 
 
 Ecuación 2 Ecuación 2bis Ecuación 2OK 
Variable Coeficiente Coeficiente Coeficiente 
Constante - 0,9525 
(0,128) 
-1,1338 
(0,110) 
-0,9099 
(0,129) 
DGW 0,1451 
(0,013) b 
0,1494 
(0,009) a 
0,1438 
(0,012)b 
DGW2 -0,0018 
(0,006) a 
-0,0018 
(0,004) a 
-0,0018 
(0,005) a 
D -0,0284 
(0,498) 
-0,0348 
(0,405) 
-0,0297 
(0,473) 
B91 0,0190 
(0,037) c 
0,0186 
(0,039) c 
0,0189 
(0,040) c 
PI - 0,2021 
(0,635) 
- 
IGFB 
 
0,0019 
(0,837) 
0,0017 
(0,852) 
- 
SLA 0,7281 
(0,164) 
0,6714 
(0,218) 
0,7231 
(0,169) 
Test Wald de significación 
conjunta* 
0,0410 c 0,0364 c 0,0233 b 
R2 aproximado 0,2594 0,2631 0,2588 
N 41 41 41 
 
Notes:  
- In parenthesis, probabilities that the coefficient be zero, using White’s robust estimation. 
- The likelihood test for the coefficients on IGFB and PI being equal to zero (chi-squared with 
3 degrees of freedom) takes value 5.5747 (critical value=7.82). 
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Notes: 
                                                          
1  For instance, Proposition 13 passed in California in 1978 implied cuts in the property local tax, which in turn 
forced the local governments to either cut on the services or increase the receipts from the provision of services or 
both. 
2 According to the City Management Association survey (ICMA, 1989), by 1989 23.9% of the local governments 
had contracted out once or more. The easiest services to contract out were those which clearly be standardized, 
which require of a large number of employees/providers and skills or specialized equipment. 
3 Donahue (1989) offers a wide look into the issue. Lopez-de-Silanes, Sheleifer and Vishny (1997) carry out an 
empirical study on the determinants of contracting out in the US. 
4  In the case of the UK, the notion of contracting out implies that a private company won the bid for the service. 
5  According to Porter and Dewey (1998) the contracting out spread faster in the UK than in the US because the 
British government transferred the benefits to favourable sectors, maximising this way the support for privatization, 
while the same selective compensation was not all that common in the US. 
6  However, Reimer (1999) finds out some tendency to concentration in this service in the UK. The largest 
companies concentrated about 60% of the contracts of solid waste collection granted to private providers. 
7  In big metropolitan areas, it is an increasing practice to split up the city into districts and contract the service in 
each district according to different procedures. The reasons for this are the exhaustion of economies of scale and the 
possibility of competition between different districts within the metropolitan area. ICMA (1989) gives account of 
this procedure in Phoenix, Arizona. More recently, in 2000, the city of Barcelona was divided into four districts for 
the concession of the service. 
8  See Savas (1987) and Hodge (2000) for a survey on empirical works. 
9  The percentage of answers is high as far as population is concerned (the answers cover about 60% of the total 
population) and somehow lower as far as the number of municipalities is concerned (13,3%). The significance of the 
responses is low in the municipalities with population below 1,000 inhabitants but it increases rapidly thereafter; 
37% of the cities with population between 5,000 and 20,000 people are covered; 50% of those between 20,000 and 
50,000 and 2/3 of the cities above 50,000 inhabitants. The sample is random and representative of the municipalities 
of Catalonia, even though the results are less representative for those municipalities under 1,000 inhabitants. 
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10  For those cases where the electoral results did not yield absolute majority of any political party in the year the 
service was contracted, individual queries were carried out to identify the political party in office that year. 
11  This could be the reason why large cities such as Phoenix and Barcelona tend to divide the city into districts and 
independently contract the service for each of these districts. 
12  The inclusion of this variable does not pose a problem of co-linearity. This would only be an issue if the sample 
size were within a very small interval, which is not the case. 
13  See Donahue (1989) for a more detailed explanation. 
14 Catalonia is divided into six administrative areas, some of which are smaller than the province. 
15  We also tried with a logit model. However, the probit model is more suitable for the periods considered, and it 
also allows for the estimation of heteroscedastic models. Since the literature up to now is silent on the superiority of 
one model over the other (see Green, 1999), we choose the probit model. 
16  The inclusion of the variable IGFB introduces heteroscedasticity problems. Thus the OLS estimators in equations 
2 and 2bis might not be consistent (Yatchew and Griliches, 1985). We re-estimated the model of equation 2bis using 
Harvey (1976) estimation to take care of the heteroscedasticity problem and we compared it with the correct model, 
2OK, which does not include IGFB and PI. The coefficients have the same sign, are also significant and are of about 
the same magnitude. 
